I. INTRODUCTION The United States Supreme Court has long held that the Double Jeopardy Clause 1 prohibits punishing a defendant twice for the same offense. 2 The Court held in Missouri v. Hunter, 3 however, that once the legislature has clearly declared its intent to impose more than one penalty for any given criminal act, the guarantee against double jeopardy cannot protect a convicted person from the imposition of multiple punishments. When all charges are brought at a single trial, the issue is merely one of statutory construction: the Double Jeopardy Clause places no restraint on the power of a legislative body to define crimes and prescribe punishments.
II. BACKGROUND: Missoui vP HUNTER
Danny Hunter and two accomplices robbed an A & P store in Kansas City, Missouri. While the robbery was in progress, a store employee alerted the police. An officer arrived at the store and ordered the three to stop. Hunter fired at the officer, who returned the fire. Hunter then escaped with his accomplices. The three were later apprehended and positively identified by both the officer and the store manager. Hunter made an oral and written confession which was admitted into evidence at trial, but offered no direct evidence in his own defense. 4 He was convicted of robbery in the first degree, 5 armed criminal action, 6 and as-the underlying felony of robbery first degree are the "same offense."' 9
The Missouri court therefore held that even though the Missouri Legislature had manifested its clear intent that a defendant should be subject to conviction and sentencing under both statutes for a single offense, the Double Jeopardy Clause "prohibits imposing punishment for both armed criminal action and for the underlying felony." '20 The Missouri Supreme Court adhered to this position when Sours I was vacated and remanded 2 ' for reconsideration in light of the United States Supreme Court's decision in Whalen v. United States. 22 Finally, in mine whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not." Id. at 304.
1 The Court reasoned that, even though counts three and five involved the same sale, that sale violated two distinct statutory provisions. Id. at 303. The first was § 1 of the Harrison Narcotic Act, 26 U.S.C. § 692 (1917), which created the offense ofselling certain drugs except from the original package. The second was § 2 of the same act, 26 U.S.C. § 696, prohibiting the sale of those drugs except on written order. Two distinct offenses were created and the defendant committed both of them in a single act. Each offense required proof of an element that the other did not. Id. at 304. Thus, they could not be the same offense for double jeopardy purposes. See also Pandelli v. United States, 635 F.2d 533 (6th Cir. 1980); supra note 26.
The Blockburger test was first set out in Gavieres v. United States, 220 U.S. 338, 343-44 (1911 1101, 1126-27 (1980) . This presumption frees the legislature to define offenses and sentences as it desires by requiring the courts to adhere to legislative schemes of punishment that are "clear and unmistakeable." Yet, it also permits the courts to reject judicial interpretations of the law, by authorizing the courts to subject multiple punishment to constitutional review, and to invalidate such punishment wherever the evidence for its intended existence is less than clear. The presumption is the only formulation that can give constitutional content to the clause without intruding upon the legislature's authority to define offenses and penalties because other constructions inevitably render the double jeopardy clause either unduly intrusive or entirely meaningless. Id. 27 445 U. S. 684 (1980 Chief Justice Burger reasoned in Hunter that the Whalen and Albemaz decisions "lead inescapably to the conclusion [that] simply because two criminal statutes may be construed to proscribe the same conduct under the Blockburger test does not mean that the Double Jeopardy 29 445 U.S. at 693-94. The defendant appealed the consecutive sentences imposed on double jeopardy grounds. The Supreme Court held that rape and felony murder were the same offense under the Blockburger test because the conviction for felony murder could not be had without proving all the elements of the offense of rape. Id. at 694. The sentences were overturned because the Court found that Congress, legislating for the District of Columbia, had not intended punishment to be imposed for two offenses arising out of the same transaction unless one required proof of a fact which the other did not, i.e., were two separate offenses under the Blockburger test. Id. at 693. Although felony murder required proof of a fact (death) not required to prove rape, the rape did not require proof of any fact that was not required to prove the felony murder. The Blockburger test requires that each offense include a fact that the other does not in order to constitute separate offenses. Clause precludes the imposition, in a single trial, of cumulative punishments pursuant to those statutes."
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In Whalen, Albernaz, and Hunter, the Court has expressed a common theme: legislative intent controls in defining crimes and fixing punishments. The holdings in these cases are in harmony with the Court's position in the earliest case involving the issue. The Court first held in Ex Parte Lange that the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits imposition of multiple punishments for a single offense. 37 On its facts, Lange did not limit legislative discretion; it only limited judicial power to impose a sentence more severe than the legislatively prescribed maximum.
More recently, in North Carolina v. Pearce, the Court held that the Double Jeopardy Clause "protects against multiple punishments for the same offense." ' 38 One commentator has interpreted Pearce as holding that the Double Jeopardy Clause also prohibits courts from imposing penalties that are excessive as defined by the sentencing authority.
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The defendant's original conviction was reversed after he had spent two and one-half years in jail. At his second trial he was sentenced to twenty-five years in prison and given no credit for the time he had already served. Thus, his total prison time would have been twenty-seven and one-half years. The Supreme Court reversed the twenty-five year sentence, even though the total sentence of twenty-seven and one-half years was less than the legislatively prescribed maximum of thirty years.4 Under the Whalen analysis, Pearce could have been sentenced to up to thirty years total prison time without a double jeopardy violation. If double jeopardy serves only to prohibit courts from imposing penalties greater than those prescribed by the legislature, then Pearce's sentence should have been affirmed. 4 1 Although Pearce does not limit legislative discretion per se, it does imply that the double jeopardy anal-36 Id. at 679. 37 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1873). Lange was convicted of an offense for which the penalty was a maximum of one year in prison or a $200 fine, but he was mistakenly sentenced to both. When the sentence was appealed, the trial judge set aside the original sentence and imposed another prison term without taking into account that Lange had already paid the fine. Congress to do so," '49 implying that when the issue was faced in a later case the Court might just as easily have held that the double jeopardy clause prohibits such statutes. Thus, the result in Hunter, in Justice Marshall's view, is not compelled by the Whalen holding, as the majority argues.
The language of Albemaz that the Chief Justice found so compelling is clearly dicta, as Justice Marshall also pointed out.
50 Albemaz involved separate punishments for different crimes under the Blockburger test.
1
The Constitution does not prohibit imposing separate punishments for such separate crimes. 52 Thus, Albemaz was unrelated to the issue of multiple punishments for the same offense presented in Hunter. In Albernaz, the only issue was whether the convictions arose out of the same offense under the Blockburger test. Once the Court found that the conspiracies charged were really two distinct offenses it should simply have confirmed the convictions.
Justices Marshall and Stevens, in dissent, also criticized the majority's overall view of double jeopardy.
53 First, they explained that it is well-settled that Hunter's prosecution under these two statutes in separate trials for the same offense would plainly have violated the dotlble jeopardy clause. 54 The . InHarris, the Court held that "when as here, conviction of a greater crime, murder, cannot be had without conviction of the lesser crime, robbery with firearms, the Double Jeopardy Clause bars prosecution for the lesser crime after conviction of the greater one." Id. at 682. 56 432 U.S. 161 (1977) . The Court held that the Double Jeopiardy Clause barred prosecution and punishment for auto theft after the defendant had already been tried, convicted, and punished for the lesser included offense of operating the vehicle without the owner's consent. The Court found that, under the Blockburger test, the crimes of "joyriding" (operating a vehicle without the owner's consent) and auto theft (joyriding with intent permanently to deprive the owner of possession) constituted the same statutory offense because the former was a lesser included offense of the latter. Id. at 168. Even though the charges had focused on different parts of a nine-day interval between the time of the theft and the defendant's apprehension, there was still only one offense, for which the defendant could not be prosecuted a second time.
clearly held that under most circumstances, a defendant may not be retried for the same elements once the initial trial has been concluded. 57 Justices Marshall and Stevens argue that the majority opinion bypasses this prohibition, and allows prosecutors to achieve the result forbidden by Haris and Brown by bringing all charges in a single trial. They do not believe that "the same offense should be interpreted to mean one thing for purposes of the prohibition against multiple prosecutions and something else for purposes of the prohibition against multiple punishment." 5 8 Double jeopardy theory holds that the ordeal of multiple trials is the primary evil to be guarded against. 59 The defendant is entitled to have his entire case finally decided by the jury first sworn to hear it.60 A state should not be allowed to use its superior resources in multiple attempts to convict the defendant. 6 60 The deprivation of the defendant's right to have a verdict rendered by the first jury sworn to hear his case is what distinguishes the possibly impermissible retrial after a mistrial is declared over the defendant's objection from a permissible retrial after the defendant's successful appeal. The defendant has a "valued right to have his trial completed by a particular tribunal." United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 484 (1970) (quoting Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 689 (1949) out of a single criminal transaction should be brought in a single trial is so strong that a number of states require this by statute. 62 The majority opinion follows this traditional view of double jeopardy. Chief Justice Burger does not see that appellate courts have a role beyond ensuring that all charges are brought in a single proceeding, and that trial courts respect legislatively prescribed maximum sentences. Since the interests of the defendant in avoiding multiple trials and in having his case heard by the first jury sworn are met when multiple charges are brought in a single trial, there may be justification for allowing in a single trial what would be prohibited in multiple trials. Under the traditional view of double jeopardy, the majority is correct, but it fails to consider other important rights of defendants. While Justice Marshall does not disagree that multiple trials for the same criminal act are a major concern of double jeopardy analysis, he also believes that there is a strong interest against multiple convictions for the same criminal act. He admits that the "[S]tate has wide latitude to define crimes and to prescribe the punishment for a given crime," and that the "[S]tate is free to prescribe two different punishments (e.g., a fine and a prison term) for a single offense." '63 Justice Marshall argues, however, that the Constitution does not permit a State to punish as two crimes conduct that constitutes a single offense. 64 Thus, while the majority emphasizes the sentence, Justice Marshall's concern is the extra conviction.
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The government in its amicus brief argued that because the legislature could simply have prescribed a harsher sentence for a single crime, the same sentence imposed for two convictions was functionally equivalent. 66 Because additional stigma results from each conviction, however, a statutory scheme that permits the prosecution to obtain two convictions and two sentences is not equivalent to a statute that permits 65 The extra conviction was also the concern of the Michigan Supreme Court when, in People v. Jankowski, 408 Mich. 79, 289 N.W.2d 674, 680 (1980) , it held that the double punishment problem could not be solved by the vacation of the multiple sentences leaving the convictions standing.
66 Hunter, 103 S. Ct. at 681; Brief for the United States as amicus curiae at 18-19.
only a single conviction, but imposes a similar or even a harsher sentence. 67 Moreover, because the State could impose the longer sentence upon conviction for a single crime, there is no legitimate purpose in seeking multiple convictions and multiple punishments. 68 Justice Marshall pointed out that "[i]f the Double Jeopardy Clause imposed no restrictions on a legislature's power to authorize multiple punishment, there would be no limit to the number of convictions that a State could obtain on the basis of the same act, state of mind, and result." '69 He believes that the power of the State to bring multiple charges increases the risk that the defendant will be convicted. The defendant must defend against and obtain acquittal on each charge; the prosecutor need obtain only a single conviction. There is more opportunity for a compromise verdict if all the jurors are not convinced by the State's case. 70 The jury may believe that with so many charges, the defendant must be guilty of something. 7 1 There is a real danger here, because courts generally will uphold an adequately supported conviction despite apparent inconsistency in the findings of guilty and not guilty on different counts of a two-count indictment. Great deference is accorded jury verdicts even when they are apparently based on compromise. was tried for robbing one of six poker players. When the jury acquitted him because the prosecution's evidence was weak, the state re-indicted the defendant for the robbery of a second of the six. The Court stated that this effort by the prosecutor to hone his trial strategy and identify and cure weaknesses in his case through successive trials was impermissible. Id. at 447, 448 (Brennan, J., concurring) . 70 103 S. Ct. at 681; see a/so Cichos v. Indiana, 385 U.S. 76 (1966)(Fortas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). As Justice Marshall explains, although the risk of a compromise verdict is also present when the lesser included offense as well as the greater offense is submitted to the jury, the risk is reduced by the rule that the lesser included offense will not be submitted to the jury if the distinguishing element is not in dispute. Hunter, 103 S. Ct. at 681 n.4; see also 
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fender to sentencing under a habitual offender statute. 7 4 Each conviction itself, moreover, represents a moral condemnation by the community-a pronouncement that a wrong has been committed.7 5 Each conviction increases the stigma and damage to the defendant's reputation resulting from this moral condemnation. Thus, the dissenters are correct in arguing that the extra conviction is as much a double jeopardy concern as is the number of trials the defendant may be forced to endure. Justice Marshall's concerns are legitimate ones, but may be answered in the future by the eighth amendment 76 or the Due Process Clause, 7 7 rather than by the Double Jeopardy Clause. The Court has recognized in a number of cases that sentence length, where not rationally related to the type of crime, may violate the eighth amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.
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The eighth amendment in this context clearly limits the discretion of the legislature in prescribing punishments for various crimes. 79 Although the eighth amendment has never been tested in the context of an unduly harsh sentence as the result of conviction of more than one statutory crime based on a single criminal act, the Court's past treatment of overly severe sentences seems to indicate that such unbridled discretion in the legislature might be limited by the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. 81 Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974) (prosecutor's discretion to re-indict a defendant on a felony charge after his conviction and successful appeal on misdemeanor charge is circumscribed by the due process clause); Rummel v. Estelle, 587 F.2d 651 (5th Cir. 1978), afd, 445 U.S. 263 (1980) , on remand, 498 F.Supp. 793 (5th Cir. 1978) (the legislature selects the punishment scheme for criminal statutes and the court is justified in striking down the legislature's choice only when it is demonstrated that that choice has no rational basis and is totally and utterly rejected in modern thought); Hardwick v. Doolittle, 558 F.2d 292, 297 (5th Cir. 1977) (due process clause may impose some as-yet undetermined limit on a state's constitutional power to classify and punish a course of conduct as several distinct offenses).
82 The Court is now most reluctant to strike down statutes on this ground, which necessitates passing judgment on the wisdom of the legislative scheme. W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW 136-38 (1972) . 83 Substantive due process might temper the legislature's power to prescribe criminal penalties by invalidating sentencing schemes that bear no substantial relationship to a legitimate public interest. The chance of substantive due process considerations arising, however, are remote. The Supreme Court has only employed this doctrine to strike down criminal statutes prohibiting specific activities. See W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, supra note 82, at 137, 137 n.6. The Court has never held that the severity of a sentence imposed under a valid statute violates due process. Id. Moreover, beginning with Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. 502 (1934) , the Court generally has refrained from invalidating any statutes on substantive due process grounds. But see Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481-82 (1975) Whalen and Albemaz in an unequivocal ruling that the Double Jeopardy
Clause does not limit the discretion of Congress or state legislatures either in defining crimes or in prescribing punishments for those crimes once defined. 8 5 Thus, apparently legislatures can define many crimes based on the same elements, prescribe a different punishment for each, and provide that defendants convicted of multiple violations based on the same criminal act may be sentenced consecutively. Whether such practices, when carried to the extreme, will be found to violate either the eighth amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, or the fifth and fourteenth amendment guarantees of due process of law, remains to be seen.
DEBORAH L. SCHMIr-84 In State v. Kaufman, 265 N.W.2d 610, 618 (Iowa 1978) , the Iowa Supreme Court held that a conviction on the lesser included as well as the greater offense violated both double jeopardy and due process.
85 It may be argued that the double jeopardy clause does indirectly limit legislatures in defining crimes and punishments because it demands a certain minimum clarity in drafting statutes. Unless legislative intent is crystal clear, the "rule of lenity" constitutionalized in Whalen mandates reversal of a cumulative sentence. See Westen & Drubel, .upra note 37, at 118.
